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Running the City for the People
By Eve Bach, Nicholas R. Carbone, and Pierre Clavel
Urban renewal, the federal highway 
program, Model Cities, community 
action, and later programs developed 
in the last decade came into existence 
under an umbrella of planning, and 
they each demanded, and provided 
support for, planning staffs. But even 
as these programs have been eclipsed 
by fiscal restraint, a new kind of plan­
ning has emerged in several cities. In 
the face of fiscal cutbacks, these cities 
pioneered redistributive policies while 
other cities cut back services ever more 
severely.* Berkeley, Calif., and Hart­
ford, Conn., are striking examples of 
planning and implementation under 
progressive majorities. Their plan­
ning, more than most, expressly fo­
cused on the interests of relatively 
disadvantaged groups, on challenging 
the agendas of elite-oriented planning, 
and on institutional innovation careful­
ly adapted to local circumstances.
'For example, Cleveland elected populist 
Mayor Dennis Kucinich and for two years 
experienced a number of progressive admin­
istrative initiatives—many of them based on 
earlier advocacy in the City Planning Depart­
ment. Madison, Wise., Burlington, Vt., and 
Santa Monica, Calif., are other cases in point.
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adapted from “Progressive Planning: 
A Report from Berkeley and Hart­
ford,’’ Working Papers in Planning 
51, Cornell University.
HARTFORD AND BERKELEY
Progressive planning developed in dif­
ferent ways in each place. In Hartford, 
there had been competent and vigorous 
staff work since at least the mid-1960s, 
but the major growth in planning came 
after 1969 as a new coalition of neigh­
borhood activists and liberals gained 
seats in the city council. By the early 
1970s this group had gained effective 
political leadership of the city and 
began making key administrative ap­
pointments. From the beginning, they 
were conscious of their neighborhood 
constituency and the desperate eco­
nomic and fiscal obstacles to survival 
as a community. Hartford was a major 
insurance, banking, and government 
center, but its population was primari­
ly poor white ethnics, Blacks, and 
Puerto Ricans who provided 43 per­
cent of Connecticut’s welfare case­
load. A Brookings Institution study 
found the economic disparity between 
the city and its suburbs to be the third 
worst in the nation. In these circum­
stances the council majority led by 
Nicholas Carbone vowed a policy of 
advocacy on behalf of the have-nots, 
and argued the legitimacy of using 
all the resources of local government 
in pursuit of that policy. They were 
to develop and implement this policy 
through the decade, until their defeat 
at the polls in 1979.
In Berkeley, the progressives for 
many years had minority represen­
tation in the city council, prior to 
moving into a leadership role in 1979. 
This began with the election of Ron 
Dellums—now Berkeley’s U.S. Con­
gressman—in 1967. The progressives 
used their minority position to advo­
cate the use of public capital for co­
operative housing, economic develop­
ment, and community-based energy 
and social-service programs. They de­
signed these programs in the 1970s as 
city resources were expanding, and 
capital accumulation could take place 
at the margin of growth. In April 1979 
the citizens of Berkeley elected five 
progressive city officials: the May­
or—Gus Newport; three council mem­
bers—Florence MacDonald, Veronika 
Fukson, and John Denton; and the City 
Auditor—Anna Rabkin. The three 
council members plus the Mayor com­
prised a near majority in the nine- 
person council because they had the 
frequent support of a then-unaffiliated 
member, Carol Davis. In 1979 this 
group set about implementing some of 
the programs that had been part of 
progressive platforms for over a de­
cade. This period of progressive influ­
ence lasted two years. The 1981 elec­
tion was swept by more conservative 
candidates who have regained control 
of the city council.
Intense planning over a long period 
of time marked both the Hartford and 
Berkeley groups. This planning was 
marked by a commitment to redistribu­
tion, which distinguished the Hartford 
and Berkeley progressive leadership 
from the “liberal” ideals that pre­
vailed in a great many other cities with 
equally impoverished constituencies. 
The Hartford and Berkeley leadership 
aimed to serve the poor quite openly 
and publicly. The result was that they
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did quite a lot of open, synthetic, 
public, and progressive planning.
In Hartford, starting from a general 
position of advocacy for the have-nots, 
the city council moved through a series 
of analyses to detail its strategy. There 
had been a Plan of Action prepared by 
a “Committee of 100,” and a two- 
year Model Cities planning process 
that involved a lot of neighborhood 
interaction. The studies impressed the 
council with both the extent of the 
economic depression facing city resi­
dents and the extent to which these 
economic problems were a distribu­
tional issue between city and suburbs.
Hartford had lost over 10,000 man­
ufacturing jobs. Of the existing work 
force of 134,000 people at the begin­
ning of the 1970s, only 34,000 were 
city residents. Of the 98,000 jobs in 
eight surrounding towns, only 18,000 
were held by city residents. Hartford 
had the highest percentage of the un­
employment, over 50 percent of the 
work force in some neighborhoods. 
The city’s population was marginal in 
terms of income. It was a population 
that needed subsidy for housing, for 
health, for recreation. They had inad­
equate income; any they might have 
went to pay for basic essentials: food, 
clothing, and shelter. An analysis by 
the Council on Municipal Performance 
clarified these inadequacies for the 
city council. Comparing 1970 popu­
lation census figures to the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics’ deprivation level 
showed that the incomes of 61 percent 
of the population of 158,000 were 
substandard by an average of $1,528 
per year. There was no way the city 
could find the tax revenues to make up 
that difference.
From this analysis, the council de­
veloped two major strategies. One was 
to reduce the cost of living within 
the city through a series of innova­
tive public-service systems such as 
energy conservation and a community 
food system. The second strategy was 
to increase incomes. The key to this 
end was a land use and transporta­
tion strategy that included litigation 
to block suburban industrial develop­
ment and highways and mass transpor­
tation policies that would encourage 
suburban development at the expense 
of the city, as well as a set of posi­
tive development plans.
These latter plans evolved along 
with council action, and were elabo­
rated piece by piece as they were 
needed. There was no one published 
document that could be pointed to as 
the “Hartford Plan.” But public state­
ments were frequent, and in early 1976 
the council formally adopted a series 
of policy papers, which, with succeed­
ing documents, boiled down the un­
derlying themes into three:
1. To increase jobs and income for 
unemployed and underemployed 
Hartford residents.
2. To improve the fiscal health of 
the city of Hartford.
3. To revitalize Hartford’s neigh­
borhoods.
These ideas, with their implicit and 
explicit redistributive implications, 
were dramatized by the Hartford lead­
ership. Most spectacular was a suit, 
brought by the city against HUD and 
six suburban towns, to stop the distri­
bution of Community Development 
Block Grants because those towns had 
not filed adequate low-income-housing 
plans. The suit was successful in that it 
provided a context for negotiation be­
tween city and suburbs on other issues, 
and allowed the council to make pub­
lic its case for Hartford’s redistributive 
claims: on welfare, federal highway 
funds, suburban affirmative action, 
and others, in addition to housing.
In Berkeley, progressive forces op­
erated from a minority position from 
1967 until their council victories of 
1979. During that period, Berkeley 
Citizen’s Action (BCA) and similar 
coalitions that preceded it produced a 
succession of separate programs oper­
ating from outside the central control 
points of city government. BCA was 
able to pressure a reluctant council to 
support some of its programs, such as 
the Savo Island Housing Cooperative. 
In addition, the city made rapid affir­
mative-action gains during this period 
due to a significant degree to the ag­
gressive demands of the progressive 
minority on the council.
During the decade of minority par­
ticipation in city government, BCA 
also successfully used the initiative 
process to change city policies and 
practices. BCA placed before the vot­
ers initiatives that established a civilian 
police review commission, controls 
over housing demolition, inclusionary 
requirements for low- and moderate- 
income housing in new housing devel­
opments, strengthened citizen partici­
pation on city boards and commissions, 
and rent control.
Public statements of overall strategy 
emerged from this experience in op­
position—most notably a book, The 
Cities’ Wealth, by E. Bach, et al., 
published in 1976—which combined 
discussion of tactics with substantive 
policy and programs. The authors in­
cluded tactics that they saw as
examples of structural, or nonre­
formist, reform, extending the actu­
al or potential realm of people’s 
power. We have tried to avoid tech­
niques for conventional political 
shifts, where one group with similar 
goals nudges out another for posi­
tion at the top, but the structure 
remains intact.
They interpreted the goals of the pro­
gressive coalitions as
efforts to improve the economic po­
sition of the city’s many renters 
and small homeowners . . . support 
for free social services to the un­
derserved poor, the transient, the 
young, the disabled and elderly . . . 
for affirmative-action programs for 
ethnic minorities and women, and 
other programs to rectify past in­
justices . . . [and] concern with 
a long list of environmental prob­
lems, from industrial pollution to 
waste recycling.
They saw cities as offering a vehicle to 
effect these goals. At the time, their 
main emphasis was on the city as a 
source of capital: they had the power 
to tax, own property, annex territory, 
borrow capital, and own and operate 
productive enterprises, in addition to 
being subject, at least formally, to 
popular control. This combination of 
redistributive goals, the drive toward 
institutionalizing popular control, and 
the notion of using the city as a vehicle 
for capital formation characterized the 
list of proposals that followed. These 
included rent control; a scheme for 
neighborhood land-use control; coop­
erative housing; public ownership and
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A general principle 
behind much of the 
Hartford innovation 
was that of substituting 
local organization for 
expensive bureaucratic 
and professional 
agencies.
control of electric power, telephones, 
and cable TV; proposals for generating 
cooperative and municipal businesses; 
a city-operated bank; redistributive tax 
and fee measures; and the develop­
ment of increased community partici­
pation in and control of various kinds 
of social services.
In summary, both the Hartford and 
Berkeley groups articulated public 
plans and principles that set their agen­
das and guided their actions. Both 
rejected the idea that private-sector 
forces were the main engine of eco­
nomic welfare and instead opted for 
public ownership, enterprise, regula­
tion, and services in major ways. They 
differed in that the Hartford group 
began with political leadership, while 
the Berkeley coalition spent a decade 
in opposition positions. In both cases, 
policy was to develop out of actions, 
but they were different kinds of action. 
In Berkeley, policies evolved from 
outside of government, from minority- 
based actions. In Hartford, policies 
evolved in the course of substantial 
control of government over a long 
period of time. Moreover, the back­
ground was different in each case: 
Berkeley was less pressed by eco­
nomic decline, though it shared the 
problems of fiscal stress in govern­
ment, particularly when BCA came 
into power at the end of the 1970s.
HARTFORD:
FROM INVESTMENT TO 
SERVICE STRATEGIES
In each place, the combination of re­
distributive policies and plans and the 
opportunities and challenges of in­
volvement in city administration re­
sulted in an extraordinary record of
innovation. Some of the new institu­
tions and practices, particularly those 
implemented early in the 1970s, were 
the results of exploitation of federal 
funding resources, in addition to pri­
vate investment projects carried over 
from previous years. But the essence 
of the innovation was the use of public 
policy to redirect private priorities. In 
Hartford, this occurred through public 
pressure on the tax structure, through 
a public land development policy, and 
through the development of new and 
reorganized public services.
The City as Tax Reformer
In 1978, a state-mandated property-tax 
reassessment was confronting Hart­
ford with two kinds of effects: a shift of 
tax burden from neighborhoods that 
had been experiencing deterioration to 
those where some reinvestment had 
been occurring, and an overall shift 
from business to residential properties. 
There was the basis for fragmentation 
of interests and conflict. White ethnic 
community leaders, representing the 
areas whose assessments would go up, 
called for the city council to throw out 
the revaluation. Black political leaders 
and civil-rights activists would not 
stand for any talk of a delay in im­
plementing the new scheme—which 
would have reduced assessments in 
their neighborhoods. Municipal un­
ions were mainly concerned about the 
prospects of revaluation shifting the 
tax burden from business and commer­
cial property to homeowners—fueling 
a taxpayers’ revolt, they feared, that 
could lead to massive budget cuts and 
layoffs. Business leaders argued that 
their property was overassessed, and 
wanted an immediate revaluation to 
lower their property assessments.
In this climate, the council leader­
ship set out to reach the fairest possible 
solution to the revaluation dilemma. 
They caused legislation to be intro­
duced in the state legislature cover­
ing several resolutions of the problem 
without committing the city to any 
one, simply to buy time. They then 
began meeting with the groups con­
cerned. They pointed out to the Black 
leaders that, even if the reassessment 
achieved a redistribution of burden 
to the relatively better-off residential 
neighborhoods, their taxes would still
go up if the shift from business assess­
ments went through. They talked to the 
white ethnic groups about the delete­
rious effects on Black neighborhoods 
if they continued to bear their pres­
ent disproportionate burden, and got 
them to agree to the principle of equi­
ty among homeowners regardless of 
neighborhood. The city council then 
filed a new bill in the legislature, 
which fixed the total tax bill that would 
be paid by homeowners after revalu­
ation at 14.6 percent, the same propor­
tion contributed by residential prop­
erty before revaluation.
At this point, the Hartford leader­
ship had gotten preliminary agreement 
on a solution to revaluation that would 
satisfy the different neighborhoods 
and, potentially, the public-sector un­
ions. But they faced heavy opposition 
in the legislature. They then encour­
aged the formation of the Citizens 
Lobby to apply pressure to the state 
legislature. Municipal unions then ral­
lied around the bill, and many city 
employees, over 3,000 of them resid­
ing in the suburbs, began to work in 
their neighborhoods urging neighbors 
to contact their state representatives 
and senators in support of the bill.
The key to passage, however, 
would be business support. At one 
meeting with representatives of the 
Greater Hartford Chamber of Com­
merce, city leaders’ arguments were 
to no avail; the chamber’s executive 
committee voted to oppose any effort 
to defer shifting the tax burden from 
business to residential property. Car­
bone then sent a telegram to each 
member of the chamber executive com­
mittee, repeating the urgency of the 
situation and asking for face-to-face 
meetings among business leaders, 
community people, and local elected 
officials. Citizens Lobby members 
made similar requests of the chief 
executive officers of the city’s largest 
corporations. As a result, some corpo­
rate leaders changed their positions, 
agreeing to remain neutral in the up­
coming legislative battle.
Despite this, some business leaders 
remained adamantly opposed. Com­
munity leaders began demonstrating 
against the business community, de­
manding that no more public money 
be used for downtown improvements.
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They picketed tax-delinquent corpora­
tions and large companies that were 
appealing their property-tax assess­
ments. And some groups argued that 
the city should spend no more tax 
dollars to rebuild the Hartford Civic 
Center Coliseum, which had been de­
stroyed when its roof collapsed earlier 
that winter. At city hall, the leadership 
began to take a tougher line, looking 
for bargaining points that could help 
leverage business support (or neutral­
ity) for property-tax relief. Their top 
legislative priority was the revaluation 
bill, which became known as the “dif­
ferential” bill because it set different 
rates of assessment for residential and 
business properties.
At this time, with the business com­
munity still generally opposed to the 
bill, the city council was pressed to 
approve funds for the Civic Center 
Coliseum. Hartford’s corporate com­
munity had a heavy investment in a 
professional hockey team, the Whal­
ers, which was part of the merger plans 
between the two major hockey leagues. 
Without a firm commitment on the new 
coliseum, the Whalers would be out of 
the expanded National Hockey League. 
The franchise—and millions of local 
corporate dollars—would be lost.
When the request to allocate funds 
for the new coliseum reached the coun­
cil floor, Carbone stated he had been 
too busy working on the revaluation 
issue to study the resolution concern­
ing the coliseum. He said he needed 
more time to review the request for 
funds. Several other council members 
made similar remarks, and the propos­
al was tabled. They had made their 
point. The strongest opponents of the 
differential bill agreed not to lobby 
against it, and other business leaders 
let it be known that they favored the 
differential as a temporary solution. If 
a sunset provision were written into the 
bill, they would support it.
The short-term struggle was won. 
For a while, at least, a $6 million tax 
shift to homeowners was avoided. In 
addition, the coalition-building around 
reassessment—and subsequent lobby­
ing—generated other legislation bene­
ficial to the city, and created new 
organizational capacity within the city 
and linked the city to sympathetic 
supporters in the suburbs.
The City as Investor 
and Regulator
At the beginning of the 1970s, Hart­
ford was already a partner in various 
investment schemes, including urban- 
renewal projects. The city’s role in 
these projects had so far been relative­
ly limited. It had put up the local share 
of project subsidies, provided some 
public works and administrative sup­
port, and had left development—and 
profits—to private developers. But the 
analyses of the city’s welfare popula­
tion that the council had initiated earli­
er suggested that a new approach was 
needed, where the primary objective 
of city policy should be to supplement 
local incomes. Consequently every in­
vestment possibility was to be evalu­
ated according to the extent it contrib­
uted toward this objective, and the city 
was to use what means it had to direct 
and regulate investment in this direc­
tion. The city’s strategy to improve 
income was accomplished in part by 
means of the courts and by taking 
advantage of administrative rules, par­
ticularly the federal affirmative-action 
hiring rules, that had not previously 
been vigorously followed. In a sense 
this was a negative strategy, meant 
to redirect private-sector development 
that was moving toward the suburbs 
from the city, and which favored the 
relatively well-educated white labor 
force over Hartford’s Black, Hispanic, 
poor, and untrained one. The other 
side of the strategy was a more positive 
one: to use vacant land and buildings 
in the central city as a resource for 
employing city people. The council 
decided that the city should become 
the retail, entertainment, cultural, and 
food service center for the region, a 
development that would create a great 
many entry level and part-time jobs 
that educationally deprived inner-city 
residents could get to supplement fam­
ily incomes.
The first and major project imple­
menting this strategy was the Hartford 
Civic Center, a $90 million complex in 
which the city put up $30 million, the 
private sector the balance. The Civic 
Center included a hotel and 360,000 
square feet of retail space on air rights. 
The city owned the land but leased the 
air rights to the hotel, office, and retail 
space, retaining a part of the equity and
a percentage of any profits through 
the air rights leases. The city had the 
state legislature enact laws to facilitate 
these arrangements. It created a Civic 
Center Authority, which allowed them 
to set up a body independent from the 
city yet able to employ people as 
city employees: the Authority would 
thus be under the policies of the city 
government but outside the bureau­
cracy and the civil-service system so 
that it could be run as a business. Be­
cause of the employees being con­
sidered city employees, the council 
could still impose a residency require­
ment. The council then negotiated 
with the school system that all the part- 
time jobs for young people had to go 
through the Hartford school system 
through the work-study program, an 
important link. Thus they took young 
people from welfare homes (75 per­
cent of the persons in the Hartford 
school system came from AFDC 
homes) and linked them into the Civic 
Center with part-time jobs—if they 
were in school.
Aetna Life and Casualty, which 
built the retail part of the Civic Cen­
ter, was required to have as pail of 
its affirmative-action plan the condi­
tion that they would (1) have minority 
businesses in the center and (2) would 
help capitalize small businesses. To 
fulfill this, Aetna put up $8 million for 
furniture, fixtures, and capitalization 
for small businesses. They took small 
businesses that were successful, that 
had a good product: for example, a 
grinder shop from Franklin Avenue 
was brought in that sold grinders (a 
submarine-type sandwich) and Italian 
foods as part of the Civic Center’s 
marketplace—a small restaurant with 
a fast turnover that seated about 25 
people. They took a Black man who 
ran a marginal liquor store but who 
was doing a good job and put him in 
the Civic Center right next to the hotel, 
where he upgraded his store. A Black 
baker who worked in a hotel as the 
pastry chef opened the John Williams 
Bake Shop. Hartford did this sort of 
thing in several buildings in which the 
city had an interest. They developed a 
policy of taking equity holdings in 
buildings and land and leasing them 
back to private developers with stipu­
lations, essentially making the city a
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partner in commercial and housing 
ventures. They asked the legislature 
for changes in the law to make it 
possible to do this: for any develop­
ment over $10 million they proposed 
to negotiate the taxes for up to seven 
years in return for one percent of gross 
rentals. If the city was to give tax 
deferrals for risky ventures, it want­
ed to participate in the profits later. 
They then formulated the City and 
Town Development Act, which went 
through the legislature in 1975, pro­
viding that the city could fix taxes for 
up to 20 years, own real estate, and 
lease it to businesses. The city could 
build factories, and it could use in­
dustrial-revenue bonds for a sinking 
bond for up to two years, resulting in 
somewhat cheaper rates to build fac­
tories, or housing. Thus the city was 
in the real-estate business. With that 
the city took ownership of an old 
abandoned Korvettes department store 
and leased it to American Airlines. 
This brought 1,000 jobs into the city, 
with the American Airlines office 
plus—as a condition of the lease—the 
use of the first two floors for small 
businesses.
The city also began to restructure 
administrative budgets and service de­
livery systems. It gave greater atten­
tion to education functions, adding 
400 positions to the Board of Educa­
tion payrolls, while subtracting 200 
from the police and fire departments, 
200 from public works. It initiated 
new school dental, lunch, and break­
fast programs—an indirect income sub­
sidy—while replacing teachers with 
paraprofessionals with local-residen­
cy requirements. It redirected $1.5 
million of Community Development 
Block Grant funds, traditionally used 
for capital investments, toward the 
school system.
Nonservice Options
A general principle behind much of the 
Hartford innovation was that of substi­
tuting local organization for expensive 
bureaucratic and professional agen­
cies. The city council began to encour­
age citizen participation, not just in 
policy decisions but in performance— 
in the actual delivery of services to 
residents.
They began with the police depart­
ment, instituting neighborhood police 
teams that were assigned to specific 
districts, in a return to the old “cop 
on the beat” theory that it was help­
ful for police officers and residents to 
know and respect one another. Every 
two weeks, neighborhood representa­
tives met with police team leaders to 
talk about problem areas. One police 
lieutenant told Carbone that he initial­
ly resisted neighborhood demands to 
crack down on street prostitution. Five 
and a half years behind a desk down­
town had taught him that prostitu­
tion is a victimless crime that should 
be ignored by the police. Residents 
who lived with the problem saw it 
differently. And he found that as the 
amount of street prostitution declined, 
so did the number of muggings, as­
saults, and other violent crimes. Bur­
glaries and drug traffic also declined. 
That kind of experience began to gen­
erate feelings of mutual respect and 
cooperation between police officers 
and residents.
In some neighborhoods, residents 
became even more directly involved in 
crime prevention efforts. Street ob­
server programs put citizen foot-patrol 
teams in direct radio contact with po­
lice officers in the area. Other neigh­
borhood groups went door-to-door, 
with police officers, to help people 
engrave their valuables with identifi­
cation numbers and offer suggestions 
on how to improve the security of their 
houses and apartments.
One of the neighborhood policy ad­
visory committees sponsored a cul­
tural awareness night, which brought 
together police officers and their 
families and people who lived in the 
neighborhood. More than 300 people 
attended this social event, which in­
cluded ethnic music and a dinner of 
soul food and Puerto Rican dishes. 
Previously, police officers and resi­
dents of that neighborhood had viewed 
each other with hostility. The team 
police concept was beginning to 
change this attitude. They now began 
to see each other as allies with com­
mon goals.
Similar efforts were made to bring 
local residents into the provision of 
recreation services. Over 40 percent of 
the city’s part-time recreation leaders 
had been suburban residents, but Hart­
ford created a neighborhood incentive 
program that allowed residents to plan 
and operate their own activities. If 
someone in a neighborhood wanted to 
teach a class in oil painting, for exam­
ple, he or she would submit a propos­
al to a neighborhood planning group. 
If it appeared that the person was 
qualified and there would be suffi­
cient interest to warrant a class in oil 
painting, the resident would be paid 
to teach the class. This system in­
volved far more people and offered a 
greater variety of recreational activi­
ties than the former, more traditional 
program. Classes developed in cross­
country skiing, squash, acting, weav­
ing, the guitar, vegetarian cooking, 
and hundreds of other areas.
Citizen Participation
By the middle of the 1970s, it was 
apparent that public and private invest­
ment, and consequent employment, 
would not by itself solve Hartford’s 
personal income problems. Nor was it 
possible to raise the flow of public 
funds into the city. Federal categorical 
programs like urban renewal and Mod­
el Cities were cut back; what had been 
an $18 million yearly subsidy was cut 
to $10.8 million in 1970, then $6 
million under the Community Devel­
opment Block Grant formulae. The 
limited fiscal resources that had greet­
ed the city council in 1969 got even 
tighter, and an economic development 
study in 1979 counted a net decrease 
of 196 person-years since 1972 de­
spite large increases in federal operat­
ing subsidies. The problem was how 
to manage decline, not growth. The 
property-tax base could not be raised, 
there was inflation pressure on taxpay­
ers and landlords, so that the popula­
tion was generally getting poorer. In 
1974 the city canceled its capital ex­
penditures for police cruisers to cover 
welfare costs, and the council increas­
ingly directed its efforts at turning 
programs toward the objective of sup­
plementing local family incomes. The 
city wrote its housing assistance plan 
under Section 8 of the Housing Act so 
that all subsidies would go to existing 
rental units rather than the construction 
of new housing—a move dictated by 
the pressure on family incomes and 
threats of landlord abandonments.
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Neighborhood Cost-Reduction 
Programs
Toward the latter part of the 1970s, 
Hartford planners adopted a strategy to 
reduce the cost of basic necessities, 
focusing on Hartford neighborhoods. 
They realized that even the most opti­
mistic forecasts of local job creation 
through infusion of outside capital 
would not suffice to provide jobs for 
every resident. They felt if they could 
help reduce the costs of such basic 
necessities as food, energy, transpor­
tation, and health care, more purchas­
ing power would be available for other 
local activities. There would be addi­
tional resources available for purchase 
of private market housing and for pa­
tronage of neighborhood retail and 
service enterprises.
The city got farthest in food and 
energy cost-reduction programs. The 
Hartford food system included a down­
town food market, a community can­
nery, community gardens, youth gar­
dens, neighborhood buying clubs, solar 
greenhouses, roof-top container gar­
dening, and a city-wide composting 
program. All elements were planned to 
complement one another. The sys­
tem was justified as developing traits 
of self-reliance and cooperative con­
sumption in residents and as generat­
ing a job environment for training that 
could later be applied to private-sector 
employment.
The energy program was initiated as 
a result of steep increases in fuel oil 
prices, which led to abandonment of 
many rental units by owners during the 
winter of 1978. This not only produced 
heating crises for many residents, it 
produced secondary effects of neigh­
borhood economic deterioration and 
loss of housing units. In response, 
Hartford planners made surveys to de­
termine the factors that made specific 
structures subject to abandonment be­
cause of energy costs or likely to 
generate complaints of heating failure. 
They used a computer-based informa­
tion system to determine what struc­
tures in the city were at risk in these 
respects, and used the information to 
target outreach workers. They created 
a Coordinated Energy Response Cen­
ter with a central ‘ ‘heat line’ ’ to permit 
quick responses to heating complaints. 
They coordinated the distribution of
weatherization kits, claiming that these 
materials could save up to 20 percent 
of each tenant’s fuel consumption. 
They established a rent receivership 
program as a last resort to maintain 
minimum heat levels and to reduce the 
likelihood of housing abandonment. 
The combined effect of targeted code 
enforcement and rent receivership pro­
grams was reported for the winter of 
1979-80. Officials stated that the land­
lords of 217 housing units corrected 
heat violations and that 51 units were 
placed into rent receivership, requiring 
the city to pay the cost of correcting 
violations.
BERKELEY: INNOVATION IN 
THE FACE OF CUTBACKS
When Berkeley Citizens Action moved 
into a position of influence in 1979, it, 
like the progressive leadership in Hart­
ford, was faced with serious budget 
problems. The newly elected leader­
ship, which had earlier seen the city 
as a source of capital formation—a 
vehicle that could carry cooperative 
housing, economic development, tax 
reform, community-based energy, and 
social-services programs—had moved 
into the driver’s seat just as the needle 
on the gas gauge moved toward empty. 
BCA had gained experience promot­
ing and forcing the implementation 
of some of its proposals. This was 
important, but nothing could have 
completely prepared newly elected of­
ficials for what they encountered in 
April 1979.
Battle of the Budget
The new council faced a proposed 
budget that had been developed by the 
City Manager who was appointed by 
the previous, more conservative coun­
cil. It called for massive service cuts 
because, under Proposition 13, city­
generated revenues were lagging seri­
ously behind the expense of maintain­
ing them at existing levels.
The budget that then-City Manager 
Michael Lawson proposed would 
close down two fire houses, eliminate 
programs in the police department that 
the community had fought to include 
(the Unit on Crimes Against Women, 
the Juvenile Bureau, the foot patrol, 
for example), cut deeply into the li­
brary budget for the second year in a
row, and completely eliminate alloca­
tions to community-based social-ser­
vice providers (the various community 
clinics and the women’s shelter, for 
example).
The first response of the new coun­
cil was to appoint a 27-member Citi­
zens Budget Review Committee. At 
the request of the committee, the date 
for passing the 1979-80 city budget 
was delayed until mid-July.
After six weeks of study and delib­
eration, the Budget Committee sub­
mitted its proposals for changes in 
Lawson’s budget, which were general­
ly adopted by the city council. The fire 
stations would remain open, but va­
cant deputy chief and lieutenant posi­
tions were eliminated. The positions in 
the police department that provided 
direct services—such as school-cross­
ing guards, foot patrol, the rape detail, 
and all positions on the street—were 
restored, with comparable dollar cuts 
made within the department by elimi­
nating administrative and rank officer 
positions. (Lawson’s budget called for 
the elimination of 46.5 positions in the 
police department, all at the point of 
service, while the Budget Committee 
called for elimination of 19 higher- 
paid positions, none providing direct 
services.)
The Budget Committee was also 
able to recommend restoration of 
funds for the library and for communi­
ty services by developing additional 
revenues for the city. The committee 
recommended several significant 
methods:
1. A property transfer tax that 
was already on the books was to be 
implemented. Passed by the pre­
vious council, it was not as progres­
sively structured as those called for 
by BCA over the years, but it in­
cluded important features that tar­
geted speculative sales and exempt­
ed long-time owner occupants.
2. Services provided by the city 
to developers and businesses that 
had been partially or wholly sup­
ported by property taxes were shift­
ed to total fee support. Building 
permits, for example, which had 
traditionally been subsidized by the 
city’s General Fund, were to be total­
ly supported by fees. The committee 
proposed to revise the fee schedule, 
which had previously been highly
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When Berkeley Citizens 
Action moved into a 
position of influence in 
1979, it moved into the 
driver’s seat just as the 
needle on the gas gauge 
moved toward empty.
regressive (as much as 2 percent of 
project costs for small projects and 
less than .002 percent for very large 
ones) to a flat rate (about 1.4 percent 
of project costs). In addition the 
committee recommended charging 
a fee for fire inspections of business­
es and industries for which no fee 
had ever been charged.
3. Activities supported by spe­
cial funds were charged for their use 
of city services. The most important 
example was the City Marina Fund, 
which had generated healthy sur­
pluses over the years that could only 
be spent in the marina area. This 
had led to expenditures for luxuri­
ous facilities in the yacht basin. 
State regulations did not allow these 
funds to be utilized elsewhere in 
the city but did allow the city to 
be reimbursed for fire, police, ac­
counting, and other administrative 
services it provided. This reim­
bursement had not been previously 
required.
4. Additional revenue was also 
generated from automobile disin­
centives. Parking meters in an upper- 
income commercial area, increased 
meter rates, and long-overdue in­
creases in parking violations fines 
were all put forward by the Budget 
Committee.
After its first heroic six weeks, the 
Budget Committee continued to meet. 
Members of the committee, as well as 
those from the city’s 30 other citizen 
boards, were invited to participate in 
the budget discussions between the 
City Manager and city departments.
In its second year, the Budget Com­
mittee took the initiative in present­
ing a new tax to the voters of Berkeley 
for their approval. Under Proposition 
13, California localities are prohibited 
from raising the ad valorum property- 
tax rate at all and can only institute
other new taxes with the approval of 
two-thirds of the voters. Working with 
another citizen body, the Board of 
Library Trustees, the Budget Com­
mittee designed a new tax based on 
the floor area of buildings to support 
the city libraries. A sample survey 
indicated that this method was feasi­
ble to implement and generally pro­
gressive. The progressivity was re­
inforced by writing in a split rate. The 
tax, which requires residential proper­
ty owners to pay 2.3 cents per square 
foot and commercial and industrial 
property owners to pay 3.5 cents per 
square foot, was approved by almost 
70 percent of the voters in June 1980. 
While the main emphasis of the tax is 
its support of library services, all other 
services in the city receive support 
indirectly, since dollars from the Gen­
eral Fund that would otherwise support 
the library have been liberated.
Rent Stabilization and 
Eviction Control
From the very earliest years of its 
history, the progressive coalition in 
Berkeley had worked to regulate the 
rental housing market. The history 
includes an interesting mixture of suc­
cesses and failures. Berkeley’s first 
rent-control ordinance was put on the 
ballot through the initiative process in 
1972, and passed with 51 percent ap­
proval . It was subsequently overturned 
in court as unconstitutional. Oppo­
nents had successfully argued that it 
was unfair to legislate rent control by 
plebiscite, since there were more ten­
ants than landlords among the voters. 
A second attempt to gain rent regula­
tion through the polls in 1977 failed to 
gain majority support.
Then, in the aftermath of Proposi­
tion 13, Berkeley—along with numer­
ous other California cities—voted in a 
mild form of regulation in 1978 by 
requiring property owners to return a 
portion of their Proposition 13 proper­
ty-tax savings to their renters. It pre­
vented rent increases for months, and 
the issue of whether the controls on 
rent increases would be extended and 
institutionalized on a permanent basis 
was pivotal in the 1979 city elections. 
BCA candidates favored rent control; 
the other group opposed it.
When BCA gained its four seats,
there was an immediate commitment 
from the nonaffiliated swing voter on 
the council to support rent regulation.
The next major task that BCA coun­
cil members undertook after passage 
of the first budget was the develop­
ment of an ordinance that would stabi­
lize rents and protect tenants from 
unfair evictions. By late fall, a far- 
reaching ordinance had gained council 
approval. However, the City Charter 
required a second reading after several 
weeks.
While the ordinance was awaiting 
its second reading, property owners, 
realtors, and others opposed to rent 
control were on the streets collecting 
signatures to have the ordinance nulli­
fied. Berkeley was reminded, for the 
third time in less than 20 years, of a 
powerful feature in the City Charter, 
whereby a small number of voters (10 
percent of those voting for Mayor in 
the last election) can petition against 
an ordinance passed by the city coun­
cil. When presented with the signa­
tures, the council can either repeal the 
ordinance or place it on the ballot at the 
next regularly scheduled election. If 
the council chooses to take the issue to 
the voters, the ordinance does not go 
into effect until after it has gained their 
approval.
Previously this provision of the char­
ter had been used in the early 1960s 
to overturn the council-approved fair­
housing ordinance. During the 1970s, 
the city’s progressive forces turned to 
this charter requirement to overturn the 
council’s decision refusing to study the 
feasibility of municipalizing the pri­
vately owned electric- distribution sys­
tem. (The study indicated it would 
indeed be feasible; given the actual 
rate of inflation since the study was 
performed, it turns out the study un­
derestimated the feasibility. Acquisi­
tion of the system was, however, twice 
rejected by Berkeley voters.)
When rent-control opponents turned 
to petitions with the requisite number 
of signatures (collected from some 
people who believed they were signing 
in favor of rent control), the BCA 
council members had to develop a 
strategy that would extend the soon-to- 
expire rent regulations in effect until a 
permanent ordinance could be passed 
in the June 1980 election. It was very
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important that there be no gap in the 
protection that renters were receiving.
The BCA council members were 
successful in providing the unbroken 
coverage. The voters approved Berke­
ley’s Rent Stabilization and Good 
Cause Eviction Ordinance at the polls. 
The council appointed members of the 
Rent Stabilization Board and set up a 
staff to implement what is necessarily 
a complex regulatory mechanism. Tre­
mendous effort still has to be devoted 
to legal defense of the ordinance. The 
courts have not yet become comfort­
able with a law that shifts the balance 
between owners and renters. After a 
year, opposition to the ordinance is 
still strong.
Cooperative Housing 
Another major BCA commitment over 
the years had been to the develop­
ment of cooperatively owned housing 
for low- and moderate-income people. 
Just as the new council members took 
office, the city’s first project opened 
(Florence MacDonald, one of the new 
council members, was among the first 
residents). A second co-op housing 
project was in the planning stages. 
Many members of the community ac­
tive in housing issues believed that the 
outcome of the 1979 election would 
determine whether or not this second 
project would see the light of day.
Like developments elsewhere, the 
construction and financing costs of 
this new project were skyrocketing. 
Between a committed city council and 
creative developers who pulled in ev­
ery outside available federal and state 
direct and indirect subsidy, the project 
moved toward realization. The magni­
tude of the costs emphasized, how­
ever, that delivering low- and moder­
ate-income housing requires a strong 
commitment, which will be tested 
repeatedly.
Redevelopment
One of the issues that separated politi­
cal factions in Berkeley for many years 
was the city’s Redevelopment Project. 
Originally planned for an industrial 
park, the redevelopment area was the 
site of intense, sometimes violent, 
conflict, as BCA fought to preserve 
existing housing and target the vacant
subsidized land for housing rather than 
industrial and commercial uses. Over 
the years, BCA had won battles that 
delayed industrial development, but 
only after the 1979 election could BCA 
change the plan to build housing.
It seemed that it would be a simple 
matter, until the council learned that 
once again Proposition 13 was block­
ing them. In the fine print of the 
redevelopment bonds was language 
requiring the Redevelopment Agency 
to collect one-third more in taxes than 
it had to pay out in debt service in order 
to amend the Redevelopment Plan. By 
cutting tax revenues below this level, 
Berkeley would have to contact bond­
holders and receive their approval be­
fore amending the plan. Just after the 
election, the Redevelopment Agency 
staff developed a method of defea­
sance to meet the legal requirements. 
As the legal clouds lift, the city will 
now need to find the millions of dollars 
of investment capital required to build 
low- and moderate-income housing.
Energy Programs
Energy issues in Berkeley presented 
themselves very differently in 1980 
than they did in 1970. For many years, 
the thrust of the BCA program was 
to have the city buy out the electric 
system. Rates that Berkeley residents 
were paying reflected the costs of ex­
panding the system in the suburbs. 
Relieving ratepayers in Berkeley of 
this expense and other savings inherent 
in a publicly owned system necessi­
tated some form of public ownership. 
In recent years, the Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company’s rate schedule was 
shifted by the California Public Utili­
ties Commission from the declining 
block structure to lifeline rates favor­
ing small users over large ones. As a 
result, Berkeley ratepayers, who have 
been successful at conservation, gen­
erally have benefited.
Meanwhile, new city programs 
were developed to foster conservation, 
especially for lower-income people. 
Instruction in no-cost and low-cost 
improvements in housing was pro­
vided by the city. Young people were 
trained to weatherize houses and pro­
vide services for elderly residents. In 
addition, the Energy Commission, an­
other citizen board, studied ways the 
city might save on its heating and fuel 
bills
Eliminating Waste
Given the tight financial situation in 
Berkeley and the commitment of the 
city council to solve basic but ex­
pensive problems, the city adminis­
tration explored ways of improving 
the organization’s productivity, reduc­
ing wasteful expenditures, and reorga­
nizing to improve efficiency. While 
Berkeley’s city council was hardly 
unique in its commitment to these 
objectives, there was an urgency about 
their realization that is directly related 
to its other progressive goals.
A more conservative city govern­
ment has options that the BCA coun­
cil members rejected, such as cutting 
costs by contracting out services to 
firms paying nonunion wages or elimi­
nating programs that serve the poor­
est (often nonvoting) people. BCA is 
a coalition—to a very large degree 
comprised of people who have been 
passed over by BCA’s more conserva­
tive opposition. The coalition depend­
ed on meeting each group’s needs— 
fully meeting them was no longer pos­
sible, but each one had weight.
In the 1979-81 period, BCA council 
members scraped together resources 
to meet the broader community needs 
in part by skimming a little off the 
top (the split rate in the library tax and 
the changes in the fee structure are 
examples). The council members also 
learned that there are significant obsta­
cles that prevented significant redis­
tribution—in Proposition 13, in the 
City Charter, in the fine balance of 
electoral politics. In this context, effi­
ciency and elimination of waste took 
on an urgency that would otherwise be 
surprising in progressive circles.
Berkeley’s campaign against waste 
was directed by Wise Allen, the City 
Manager appointed by the city council 
in February 1980. He immediately 
targeted an array of nonproductive but 
increasingly expensive costs—work­
men’s compensation payments, forex- 
ample. He initiated an occupational 
health and safety program. In Califor­
nia cities, attention to these costs was 
not unusual. What may distinguish the
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Liberal governments 
have always been 
theoretically in favor of 
“citizen participation,” 
but Berkeley and 
Hartford actively 
encouraged it, tapping 
a source of energy, 
creativity, and support.
Berkeley approach, however, is Al­
len’s belief that the problems had to be 
solved by the people working for the 
city. Solutions designed by the people 
who face the problems can be carried 
out in a way that the ideas of an outside 
consultant—no matter how creative— 
are unlikely to be.
Public Services Committees
The Labor-Management-Citizen Pub­
lic Services Committee Project is a 
collaborative effort involving the city 
of Berkeley, unions representing city 
employees (SEIU Locals 535 and 390, 
IBEW Local 1245, and the Berkeley 
Firefighters Association), and mem­
bers of citizen commissions and citi­
zen organizations. The thrust of the 
program is to focus the attention of the 
three parties on the overriding problem 
they share—that is, how to maintain 
and improve the delivery of municipal 
services in an environment of fiscal 
scarcity.
The Public Services Committees 
provide a cooperative, nonadversarial 
forum for identifying service delivery 
and work organization problems and 
solutions to those problems. The Proj­
ect supplements but does not super­
sede the collective-bargaining agree­
ment between the city and the unions. 
A unique feature of the Project’s ap­
proach is to involve citizens, the con­
sumers of city services, in the collabo­
rative labor-management work review 
process.
The locus of the Project’s work is in 
discrete work units in different city 
departments, where three-sided Public 
Services Committees are being estab­
lished to identify and rectify problems 
in work organization and service deliv­
ery. A three-sided city-wide coordi­
nating committee makes broad policy 
for the Project and monitors and sup­
ports the functioning of the work-site 
committees. The Project was suggest­
ed by the Citizens’ Budget Review 
Commission in November 1979. Since 
that time, dozens of well-attended in­
formational and exploratory meetings 
have cleared the way for the enthusias­
tic commitment of all three parties to 
the Project.
CITIZEN ACTION IN AND 
OUT OF OFFICE
Clearly, progressive ideas infused 
both cities’ administrations. In Hart­
ford and Berkeley, progressive move­
ments depended on local organizing 
efforts. Hartford’s Citizens Lobby had 
city hall support, as did Berkeley’s 
Citizen Budget Committee, but these 
were only the most dramatic, peak- 
level examples of what was a much 
more widespread phenomenon. Lib­
eral governments have always been 
theoretically in favor of “citizen par­
ticipation,” but Berkeley and Hart­
ford actively encouraged it, tapping 
a source of energy, creativity, and 
support. Thus, planning took on an 
importance and role it had not had 
previously. In Hartford, technical 
planning analyses quantified and re­
inforced the premises of the general 
advocacy policy, and then suggested 
specific programs that the council 
could pursue. In Berkeley, plans were 
elaborated in opposition that were only 
partially carried out later, but they 
nevertheless served to punctuate a gen­
erally progressive agenda.
Now out of power, the Hartford and 
Berkeley progressives face the ques­
tion of what legacy they leave. On the 
one hand, there is the painful knowl­
edge that progressive municipal poli­
tics is an uphill struggle against great 
odds. The most immediate difficulties 
in both places came from the fiscal 
pressures on city budgets. Proposition 
13 in California and the generally in­
creasing gap between needs and rev­
enue sources in Hartford resulted in 
very severe restrictions in local auton­
omy. This has meant that progressives
have to work very hard just to keep the 
service levels of yesterday. The possi­
bilities for significant change are se­
verely diminished. Hartford’s experi­
ence clearly demonstrates the political 
liability of redistribution at the mar­
gin of shrinkage. Berkeley’s begins to 
show the liability that progressives 
face when their fancy technical foot­
work does not keep up with an acceler­
ating crisis in public finance.
With electoral defeat, there was also 
an awareness of the fragile nature of 
most progressive innovations. Most 
participants in the Hartford adminis­
tration dispersed after 1979, and many 
innovative practices were reversed. In 
Berkeley, the BCA retained a minority 
position on the council, and it is not 
yet clear what reverses will occur. But 
in both places electoral defeat raised 
the question of how to institutionalize 
the changes that seemed to work. The 
Hartford and Berkeley progressives 
have had some permanent accomplish­
ments—a civic center in one case, 
housing cooperatives in the other. The 
long-term lease arrangements in Hart­
ford cannot be altered, and the experi­
ence of the Citizens Budget Review 
Committee in Berkeley might be re­
membered for a while. But the en­
emies made by these arrangements 
were probably better organized than 
their friends were. And the general 
structure of municipal practice in af­
firmative action, regulation, and pub­
lic enterprise can be dismantled rather 
easily—and was in Hartford. These in­
novations requiring a continuing com­
mitment are easier to replace with more 
traditional modes of government than 
it is to initiate them in the first place.
Nevertheless, what had been 
achieved made more sense for the 
people who had been served—the ma­
jority—than the “moderate” or even 
reactionary themes adopted by their 
successors. Future elections might 
show this. Moreover, other cities, fac­
ing similar economic issues, have tried 
to move in similar directions. Even as 
BCA went down to defeat in Berkeley, 
a rent-control coalition swept to victo­
ry in Santa Monica. There and in other 
places, progressive administration will 
continue to be tested and experience 
will accumulate. ■
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